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Evolution of Opinions in the Growth-vs-Environment Debate: 
Extended replicator dynamics 
 




The evolution of opinions in the long-standing debate on growth-versus-environment may affect 
support for important sustainability policies, in areas such as biodiversity loss, climate change, 
deforestation and freshwater scarcity. In order to understand this evolution, we develop a model 
describing the dynamics of four distinct opinions as identified in recent surveys, namely growth-at-
all-cost, green growth, agrowth and degrowth. The model is based on modifying standard replicator 
dynamics to match a multi-group structure. Individuals are influenced by local or global interactions 
with others, based on adjacent opinion groups and exposure to information about environmental 
change. Psychological resistance to opinion change is also accounted for. The model is calibrated 
with recent survey data. Numerical analysis shows which opinions survive under particular 
conditions. We find, among others, that under local interactions, ultimate outcomes are characterized 
by lack of consensus, i.e. survival of multiple opinions. In addition, equal impacts of environmental 
change on opinions do not always translate in joint survival of associated opinions. Under worsening 
environmental conditions while continuing economic growth, opinions shift from green growth to 
agrowth and degrowth. Fostering global interactions among individuals, causing them to be 
influenced by a broad spectrum of opinions, makes consensus more likely. We also consider model 
dynamics if feedback from opinions to policy to environmental change and back is included. This 
confirms robustness of the results. It should be noted that the model is not meant to predict but to 
explore the consequences of combinations of assumptions about social networks, psychological 
mechanisms, environmental dynamics, and connections between opinion distribution and 
environmental policy. The study represents the first analysis of opinion dynamics in the growth-vs-
environment debate and suggests a number of routes for further investigation. 
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Since the 1950s a debate has been wavering on the natural and social “limits-to-growth”, comprising 
optimists, pessimists and more subtle viewpoints (Galbraith, 1958; Mishan, 1967; Meadows et al., 
1972; Maddox, 1972; Beckerman, 1976; Hirsch, 1976; Daly, 1977; Simon, 1981; Arrow et al., 1995; 
Kahneman et al., 2004; Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009). Recently, the debate has been revived in 
academia by the challenge of avoiding dangerous climate change (van den Bergh, 2017), while it also 
has received frequent attention in major global news outlets (Turner and Alexander, 2014; Porter, 
2015). Although the literature on this debate is extensive, surprisingly no attention has been given to 
associated opinion dynamics. Obtaining insight into such dynamics is relevant as support for 
particular sustainability policies – such as in the areas of biodiversity loss, climate change, 
deforestation or freshwater scarcity – may depend on the degree of consensus in the debate. Opinion 
dynamics are driven by two main factors, namely interactions between individuals with the same, 
similar and distinct opinions, and information about economic growth and environmental problems 
through various channels, such as newspapers, television and Internet-based social media. Modelling 
can help to understand and explore the resulting opinion dynamics under distinct assumptions and 
scenarios as it involves complex interactions between many individuals participating in overlapping 
social networks of opinion exchange. Accordingly, one can examine if and when opinion dynamics 
in a population results in a stable distribution reflecting consensus, fragmentation or polarization. 
Political opinions as in the growth debate are associated with worldviews (Drews and van 
den Bergh, 2017), formed mainly during childhood and adolescence – under the influence of parents, 
other family, teachers and peers. Relevant insights are provided by social psychological research 
(Johnston and Wronski, 2013) on the individual perspective behind formation of opinions. It finds 
that opinion dynamics may be driven by compliance with the majority opinion, peer pressure toward 
conformity, or a process of deliberation by individuals exchanging facts or opinions (Lorenz et al., 
2011). Modelling allows to capture the collective dynamics resulting from the interaction of many 
individuals (Castellano et al., 2009; Xie and Song, 2016; Sîrbu et al., 2017; Tur et al., 2018). The 
application of general models is motivated by opinion dynamics in distinct areas sharing basic 
features, which is due to their basis being the same human capacity for opinion formation and social 
interaction. Evolutionary modelling emerges as a suitable modelling approach as it typically describes 
the interaction of many individuals in a population characterised by diversity of behaviours or 
opinions (Gargiulo and Ramasco, 2012). 
Here we develop a simple model of opinion dynamics that reflects the essence of the growth-
vs-environment debate. It involves an extension of the well-known model of replicator dynamics 
(Taylor and Jonker, 1978) resulting from describing adjacent interactions among multiple groups. 
The resulting approach has the advantage of being relatively simple, implying transparency and a 
limited number of parameters. It is not meant to be predictive but aimed at exploring likely outcomes 
under distinct assumptions and scenarios. It is clear that the growth debate is too complex and 
involves too many people to be predictive. However, we can learn about potential changes under 
particular conditions and assumptions, and this would already be a great advance over the static, 
descriptive and historical accounts. It allows an analysis of the case in which individuals are 
influenced by others with sufficiently similar opinions, causing local interactions in the population to 
steer opinion dynamics. For comparison, we also consider the case of global connections, i.e. 
interactions between all individuals in the population. In addition, individuals are influenced by 
(information about) the development of environmental problems over time. We further consider an 
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extended model with feedback from opinions to policy to environmental change and back. A few 
studies provide insight into this (Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008; Anderson et al., 2017). 
Of course, one could follow a more disaggregate modelling method, and describe mutual 
interactions among individual agents with psychological features and worldviews (a more 
behavioural approach), which would lead to an agent-based model (ABM). We think it is not a logical 
place to begin, though, for three reasons: opinion dynamics modelling is dominated by aggregate 
models (see surveys mentioned above); an ABM approach would require more assumptions regarding 
parameter values, while not necessarily capturing better the essential factors and dynamics. Given the 
limited empirical data available in the literature, notably absence of long term time series on opinions 
in the growth-vs-environment debate, it seems wise to adopt an initial model approach that is simple 
and transparent with relatively few parameters. This may start a new line of research, which can guide 
further work and suggest hypotheses for testing by empirical research or confirmation and elaboration 
through more disaggregate models. 
We should stress that our study is not completely aggregate because it includes a subtle 
disaggregation by innovatively adapting the standard replicator dynamics to four groups with an 
associated asymmetric network structure. Such an approach comes in fact down to an intermediate 
level of (dis)aggregation, which allows the merger of certain advantages of aggregate and 
disaggregate approaches. In addition, one can interpret certain parameters in the model from a 
behavioural-psychological angle. While opinion dynamics in the growth debate might show 
similarities to that regarding environmental values or political opinions, the uniqueness of the current 
study consists of three elements. First, the asymmetric network structure which captures how opinions 
in the growth-vs-environment debate are positioned from one extreme to another. Second, the 
heterogeneous effect of environmental dynamics on distinct positions. And third, the initial values of 
these positions are unique and critical for the final outcome. 
 
2. Opinion dynamics in the growth debate 
The theme of opinion dynamics has received limited attention in the context of the growth-vs-
environment debate. Schmelzer (2015) traces the historical roots of the ‘economic growth paradigm’, 
identifying a series of critical factors, such as GDP accounting, international organisations, World 
War II, the Cold War and notions of social progress. Earlier, Sandbach (1978) argued that Malthusian 
and environmentalist perspectives rose to prominence in the 1960s and early 1970s but then witnessed 
a decline in interest. This he attributes to criticisms of these perspectives and economic and political 
changes which reduced interest in the environment, including the realization that reducing growth 
would not just be difficult but potentially very costly. The author describes the events, publications 
and opinion leaders influencing the course of the debate and associated shifts in opinions. A more 
recent history is sketched by Higgs (2014), who argues that the strong commitment of modern 
societies to economic growth has marginalised the ample evidence for the problematic relationship 
between growth and environmental sustainability. 
Research has identified several channels through which environmental concern, notably 
about climate change, is influenced by experiences of environmental change. Studies show that 
temperature anomalies – i.e. temperature deviations from the mean – have an effect on various public 
perceptions of climate change (Capstick et al., 2015). In addition, direct and indirect experiences of 
extreme weather events can affect public perceptions (Demski et al., 2017). Indirect experiences 
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involve TV meteorologists educating their viewers on the links between local extreme weather and 
climate change (Zhao et al., 2014). 
By considering the influence of information on opinions in this study, we effectively examine 
how psychological features play a role, such as openness versus resistance to other worldviews or 
new information. One may argue that motivated reasoning leads to politically polarized views on 
climate change, that is, ideologies and values shape people’s interpretation of climate information 
and subsequent concern (Kahan et al., 2012). More information would then only increase concern if 
it is consistent with one’s worldviews.  However, this position is debatable for various reasons. First, 
the study by Kahan et al. focuses on general knowledge or education, not specifically climate-related 
information. Second, empirical studies for six culturally and politically diverse countries show that 
higher levels of knowledge about the consequences (and causes) of climate change are linked to 
greater concern for the large majority of countries, even when controlling for different values (Shi et 
al., 2016). We assume that with rising environmental deterioration, the influence of environmental 
knowledge will take precedence over worldviews. Third, recent research on environmental 
communication has discovered various ways of bridging polarized environmental views by 
information provision that is in line with people’s values and ideology (Johnson, 2017; Whitmarsh 
and Corner, 2017). In addition, whereas in a bi-polar case of pro/anti-growth political ideology and 
worldviews may dominate, in our study with a focus on four opinions this connection is likely to be 
weaker. 
Two recent opinion survey studies about the growth debate among citizens and scientists 
provide a useful background for the empirical set-up employed in the analysis of this study (Drews 
and van den Bergh, 2016, 2017). These studies identified four main opinions that go beyond a simple 
dichotomy of optimism/pessimism or pro/anti-growth: (1) Growth-at-all-cost (GC) with full priority 
for economic growth and little to no concern for the environment; (2) Green growth (GG) expressing 
the belief that economic growth and environmental sustainability are desirable and compatible; (3) 
Agrowth (AG) reflecting the idea that since GDP is not a good proxy of social welfare we should be 
indifferent about economic (=GDP (per capita)) growth; and (4) Degrowth (DG) reflecting the idea 
that we need to stop economic growth and downscale the economy to achieve environmental 
sustainability. Our model of opinion dynamics will describe the shares of these four opinions in the 
population of all opinions. Table 1 explains these opinions and summarizes the core features of the 
associated individuals. What is especially attractive of this more subtle distinction as opposed to a 
classic pro/anti-growth or pessimistic/optimistic-about-growth-limits distinctions is that while a 
change in these dichotomous opinion settings is difficult – though not impossible – because of 
ideological barriers, such barriers are weaker between adjacent opinions in the quadruple case. We 
also considered two variables framed as “I have strong opinion about economic growth” and “I have 
mixed opinions about economic growth” from an earlier empirical study about the growth debate 
(Drews and van den Bergh, 2016) as an indicator of attitude strength (Howe and Krosnick, 2017) or 
resistance to changing one’s opinion in the face of new information or other opinions. The two 
indicators show average scores for GC, GG, AG and DG opinions, on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) 
to 7 (totally agree), of 4.13, 4.26, 4.24 and 4.33, and respectively 4.18 4.20, 4.49, 4.45. In addition, 
no significant difference in the distribution of responses is found across the four opinions. All this 
indicates that there is no evidence for assuming heterogeneity in this respect, motivating the 




Table 1. Sensitivities of individuals’ opinions to economic, environmental and social contexts  









Economic growth Strong positive 
opinion about GDP 
(per capita) growth 
Weak positive 
opinion about GDP 
(per capita) growth 
GDP (per capita) 
ignored 
Negative opinion 
about GDP (per 
capita) growth 
Environment Largely ignored Moderate focus Moderate-strong 
focus 
Strong focus 
Social network Strong with GC 
Weak with GG 
Strong with GG 
Weak with GC, AG 
Strong with AG 
Weak with GG, DG 
Strong with DG 
Weak with AG 
 
Table 1 shows that with respect to sensitivities to real-world changes, individuals in the first 
group with opinion GC are unaffected by environmental changes. Although one might think this view 
is extreme, Drews and van den Bergh (2016) find that a small proportion of individuals actually fall 
into this category. Other research suggests that associated environmental disinterest and skepticism 
are due to insufficient education and environmental knowledge, religious and conservative values, 
lack of trust in science and society, and other concerns (e.g., economic success and growth) that are 
seen as competing with environmental concerns (Zhou, 2015). On the other end of the spectrum, we 
assume that DG shows the highest sensitivity to environmental change. This is in line with findings 
from Drews and van den Bergh (2016) that support of degrowth is significantly associated with 
environmental values. The two remaining groups GG and AG fall in-between. A network structure 
of diffusion of opinions about growth-versus-environment reflects a strong degree of homophily, 
meaning that individuals tend to interact mainly with those holding similar opinions (Shalizi and 
Thomas, 2011). The next section will offer more details about the social network associated with the 
dynamics of the four opinions. 
 
3. A multi-group replicator model of opinion dynamics 
The model is comprised of three main elements: (i) individuals’ opinions are affected by social 
influence; (ii) they further are sensitive to empirical information about the actual conflict between 
growth and environment; and (iii) policies may change the balance of opinions in some way, such as 
through influencing social interactions. We develop a multi-group replicator dynamics model 
extending basic replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). The idea is close in spirit to Weisbuch 
et al. (2002, 2005) who posits the idea that agents tend to update their idea only if they interact with 
people within a certain threshold in their opinion spread. We approach this problem differently, 
though, namely by imposing four opinions and a network with local interactions between adjacent 
groups. Generalized to n opinions, it takes the following form (for a derivation, see Appendix A): 
 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓?̅?) +
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑠𝑗(𝑓?̅? − 𝑓̅)
𝑛
𝑗=1 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.     (5) 
 
Here ?̇?𝑖 (≡ 𝑑𝑠𝑖/𝑑𝑡) represents the change in the share of opinion i in the population for the four 
opinions: Growth-at-all-cost (GC, or i=1), Green growth (GG, or i=2), Agrowth (AG, or i=3) and 
Degrowth (DG, or i=4). The first term on the right-hand side of the equation represents the influence 
of group-specific interactions and the second of remaining interactions among individuals. The latter 
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are the same for all opinions (needed to assure that shares add up to 1), causing the dynamics to be 
completely determined by differences in the group-specific interactions. The 𝑓?̅? denote group-specific 
average fitness, which deviate from global average fitness 𝑓 ̅in the standard replicator dynamics, as 
they are constructed taking into account the shares of each opinion (𝑠𝑖) and interaction networking 
intensities/psychological resistance (𝑤𝑖
𝑗












,        (4) 
 
The denominator in this equation assures that the fitness values 𝑓𝑖 are multiplied with weights 𝑤𝑗
𝑖𝑠𝑖 
that always add up to one. 
The symbol 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 denotes networking intensity and psychological resistance. The first reflects 
the intensity of particular interactions in the network structure of interactions among individuals; and 
the second psychological resistance to other opinions. The double meaning suggests that with a low 
𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 one is unlikely to change one’s opinion as one communicates little with other opinions or has 
strong resistance against these. 
The network of interactions is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of local (group-internal) and 
adjacent-group interactions, consistent with the last row in Table 1. In the network of communication, 
individuals in GC and GG influence each other but those in AG and DG do not influence individuals 
in GC and vice versa. This structure reflects discounting of outlier opinions, where an outlier is 
defined relative to the opinion of each group. In other words, only opinions of adjacent groups directly 
influence individuals, not those in groups at further distance. This is consistent with empirical 
findings that environmental opinions tend to be segregated within like-minded communities or echo 




Figure 1. Social network of opinions based on in-group and adjacent interactions  
 
We will consider two distinct matrices of networking intensities/psychological resistance 𝑤𝑗
𝑖, as 
visualized in Figure 2. In case (a) these reflect that interactions among individuals are limited to own 
and adjacent groups, while opinions of individuals within the own group have a higher impact than 
those of individuals in adjacent groups, and opinions of individuals in groups further apart have no 
impact at all: 𝑤𝑖
𝑖 > 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
> 0 ∀ 𝑖 ≠  𝑗 and |𝑖 − 𝑗| = 1, and 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 0 ∀ |𝑖 − 𝑗| > 1. The groups are 
ordered as GC-GG-AG-DG, as visually illustrated in Figure 1, with individuals in group GC 
interacting only with individuals in their own group and group GG, while individuals in group DG 
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only interact with those in their own group and group AG. On the other hand, the “interior” groups 
GG and AG show a different interaction pattern, namely with members from the own-group and the 
two adjacent groups: i.e. individuals in group GG interact with those in groups GC, GG and AG, 
while individuals in group AG with GG, AG and DG. This network structure is consistent with Figure 
1. For comparison, we also consider global interactions, that is, individuals being able to interact with 
individuals from any other, not only adjacent, group. This is illustrated by case (b) in Figure 2. 
Formally, networking intensities/psychological resistance are: 𝑤𝑖
𝑖 > 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
> 0 ∀|𝑖 − 𝑗| ≥ 1, thus, 
maintaining the logic that interaction between adjacent groups is stronger while also  allowing for 
interaction with outlier opinions. Such global interactions might be considered as the outcome of 
applying public policies that stimulate interactions between individuals holding distant opinions. 
Concrete policy instruments in this respect are stimulating easy access to news media – or perhaps 
even free access for adolescents and young people up to a certain age, when opinions are formed. 
Other examples are communication of descriptive norms (Cialdini, 2007; Nyborg et al., 2016) and 





(a)                                    (b) 
Figure 2. Illustration of social network structures assumed in the model, reflecting: (a) interactions 
among adjacent opinion groups, or (b) global interactions 
Note: Colour and size of the circles illustrate the magnitude of the respective networking 
intensity/psychological resistance. 
 
We further assume that people’s environmental concern increases through direct and indirect 
experiences of environmental problems. To capture this, we include an index that expresses the 
development of environmental problems over time, such as climate change or biodiversity loss, under 
a pattern of continued economic growth. This might reflect what happens in reality or what science 
predicts will happen. A change in this index will have heterogeneous effects on the fitnesses of the 
distinct opinions (captured by the parameter 𝑏𝑖 – see Methods section for more details), in a way that 
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worsening of environmental quality under growth will more positively affect the fitnesses of opinions 
more to the right in Figure 1. This is captured by the next equation. 
 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐+𝑏𝑖𝐸.           (6) 
 
A change in this index will have heterogeneous effects on the fitnesses of the distinct opinions 
(captured by the parameter 𝑏𝑖), in a way that worsening of environmental quality under growth will 
more positively affect the fitnesses of opinions located to the right in Figure 1. We will assess the 
effects on opinion dynamics of both permanent and temporary environmental changes, as illustrated 
in Figure 3. This does not mean we assume this is the only possible scenario. However, the main 
alternatives, a constant 𝐸 over the entire period would translate into an exogenous and constant 
fitness, while a decreasing 𝐸 (improving environmental quality) would simply have the opposite 
effect of an increasing one. More details are provided in the Methods section. 
 
       
(a)            (b) 
Figure 3. Scenarios of environmental change under continued economic growth: (a) permanent 
environmental deterioration, and (b) temporary environmental deterioration  
 
4. Results 
In the following we consider as a starting point a situation where opinion shares in the population are 
distributed as follows: 4% for GC, 59% for GG, 21% for AG and 16% for DG. These values 
approximate empirical findings of Drews and van den Bergh (2016). The simulation period covers 
500 time steps, assessed as sufficiently long for opinion shares to stabilize. Time steps might be 
interpreted as months or weeks, which translates into an effective period of roughly 10-40 years. The 
model was programmed in R software. 
For adjacent interactions (consistent with Figure 2a) we assume 𝑤𝑖
𝑖 = 0.8, 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 0.2 ∀ 𝑖 ≠
 𝑗 and |𝑖 − 𝑗| = 1, and 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 0 ∀  |𝑖 − 𝑗| > 1. For global interactions (consistent with Figure 2b), we 
assume 𝑤𝑖
𝑖 = 0.8, 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 0.2 ∀ |𝑖 − 𝑗| = 1, 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 0.1 for |𝑖 − 𝑗| = 2 and 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 0.05 for |𝑖 − 𝑗| = 3, 
implying less intensive interactions among members of distinct groups than under adjacent 
interactions.  
Opinion fitnesses are initially equal (𝑓𝑖 = 1 ∀ i), i.e. in equation 6 parameter c=1 (given that 
at time zero E=0). This can be motivated in two ways. First, different fitnesses arise immediately once 
environmental dynamics comes into play. Second, the assumption of equal fitness can be regarded as 
characterizing a stable starting point. Due to environmental dynamics as described by this equation, 
fitnesses alter as depicted in Figure 3a or b, but to different degrees, depending on the values of 𝑏𝑖 
for each opinion group, which we will vary, according to three cases as shown in Table 2. The logic 
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behind the choices is as follows: GC serves as reference value given that not all values need to change, 
as fitnesses only have meaning in terms of relative values; as explained in the previous section, DG 
is expected to respond strongly to environmental worsening, while AG may respond weakly or 
strongly, with the latter being more likely, and GG may also respond weakly or strongly, but with the 
first being more likely. This explains the distributions of parameter values for the three cases in the 
table. We adopt only values 0.1 and 0.5 to limit the number of combinations. We include equal values 
for some 𝑏𝑖 to test whether the joint survival of respective opinions in standard replicator dynamics 
upholds in our model under adjacent interactions. Considering a wider range of 𝑏𝑖 parameters with 
the same relative order will just rescale the time span within which one obtains the final outcomes: if 
𝑏𝑖 values are very high (low) outcomes are reached rapidly (slowly). 
 
Table 2. Scenarios for impact of environmental change on opinions through parameters 𝑏𝑖 








A 0 0.1 0.1 0.5 
B 0 0.1 0.5 0.5 
C 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
Case A 
The top part of Figure 4 shows simulations for case A in Table 2 with social interactions limited to 
adjacent groups. We observe the survival of two opinions, namely GG and DG. The left chart of the 
figure demonstrates how fitnesses of all four opinion groups change over time due to the 
environmental index increasing (equation 6), while the right chart illustrates the evolution of the 
shares of these opinions. While under standard replicator dynamics only one or multiple alternatives 
with (equal) highest fitness would survive, the figure shows that under multi-group evolution as in 
our model two opinions with distinct fitness values survive, namely GG next to the best-fitness 
opinion DG. The reason is that the latter is buffered from the effect of a growing share of opinion DG 
by the existence of an ‘in-between’ opinion AG in the network structure. In other words, local 
selection effects assure survival of more opinions, as opposed to replicator dynamics where all 
selection is global in nature so that no such buffering is possible. This is illustrated in the second top 
panel in Figure 4, where, consistent with Figure 2b, we allow for interaction between opinion groups 
being further away from each other (global social interactions). In this case, DG is the only surviving 
opinion in the long run. 
 We also undertook simulations for the same case A, but with environmental change occurring 
only in a limited time window (periods 101-150, as illustrated in Figure 3b). The results of this, shown 
in Figure B1 (in Appendix B), show that the stable outcomes remain the same (i.e. two and one 
opinions dominate in the long run, respectively), highlighting that very small fitness differences due 
to temporary environmental change are sufficient to achieve the same patterns. 
 
Case B 
The middle part of Figure 4 contains the results of simulations for case B in Table 2. If social 
interactions are limited to adjacent groups, only opinion GG disappears in the long run while the 
adjacent opinion AG dominates, and GC survives at a level close to its initial share. Here, GC is 
buffered in a negative way by the extinction of adjacent opinion GG, cutting any indirect interactions 
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with groups exhibiting higher fitness (AG in this case). The small increases in the shares of GC and 
DG (between periods 101 and 150) is due to the second term in equation 5, which distributes a small 
part of the disappearing GG opinions to the two extreme opinion groups. Figure 4 indicates that if, 
under case B, communication between groups is global, only AG and DG opinions survive. 
 If we now again consider environmental change to be restricted to a limited time interval 
(consistent with Figure 3b), our results do not change much (see Figure B1 in Appendix B).  
 
Case C 
The bottom part of Figure 4 shows simulations for case C in Table 2, with adjacent and global 
interactions among opinion groups under permanent environmental change (results under temporary 
environmental change are in the bottom part of Figure B1 in Appendix B). Visual inspection suggests 
that the results are identical, but in fact they differ slightly. The reason for similarity is that the 
outcomes are dominated by the assumption of equal impacts of environmental change on fitnesses. 
 We further experimented with alternative networking intensities/psychological resistance for 
local interactions (Figure 2a), namely shifting them from the interaction inside the group to the 




= 0.49, an option with the most intense between-group interaction given the condition 




0 ∀ 𝑖 ≠  𝑗 and |𝑖 − 𝑗| = 1). In this case, our model produces the same (qualitative) patterns of opinion 
distribution as reached under adjacent interactions with networking intensity/psychological resistance 
values as in the previously presented results (Figure 4). That is, the same opinions survive, and even 
their rank stays the same, demonstrating robustness of our results to variation in parameter values. 
Results of this exercise are shown in Figure B2 (Appendix B). 
As an additional robustness test, we examine what happens if psychological resistance is 
higher, in line with our earlier discussion on this. To achieve this, we reduce the variable “networking 
intensities/psychological resistance” for adjacent groups by half and repeat the experiments described 
for cases A, B and C. Results, reported in Figure B3 (Appendix B), alter very little and remain 
qualitatively the same. Due to higher psychological resistance the shares of opinions change more 









5. Extending the model with policy feedback 
So far we assumed the degree of environmental problems (E) under continued growth to be 
exogenous. Here we examine the robustness of the previous results under an additional feedback, 
namely that opinions affect policy, in turn the environment, and then back to opinions (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Adding policy feedback 
 
The main challenge here is translating opinions to policy. Since important (global) environmental 
problems are cumulative in nature – i.e. pollution in the past affects the degree of current 
environmental problems – environmental policy can only affect the change of such problems (Δ𝐸𝑡). 
We calculate this change by weighting the policy impact of each of the four opinions (𝛾𝑖) in each 
period by their respective shares (𝑠𝑖). Since we assume a linear shape of impact curves for 𝐸𝑡, these 
𝛾𝑖 take on constant values. In formal terms we have:  
 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡−1 + Δ𝐸𝑡  = 𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝑠𝑡,𝐺𝐶𝛾𝐺𝐶 + 𝑠𝑡,𝐺𝐺𝛾𝐺𝐺 + 𝑠𝑡,𝐴𝐺𝛾𝐴𝐺 + 𝑠𝑡,𝐷𝐺𝛾𝐷𝐺          (7) 
 
We assume the following inequality 𝛾𝐺𝐶 > 𝛾𝐺𝐺 > 𝛾𝐴𝐺 = 𝛾𝐷𝐺  to hold, as illustrated in Figure 6. It 
means that if everyone has the GG opinion then the middle curve applies (i.e. identical to Figure 3a 
of the basic model); if all opinions are GC then the top curve is relevant, associated with weaker 
environmental policy and more focus on pure economic growth, which leads to a faster increase of 
environmental problems; and if everyone supports DG or AG the bottom line applies, based on the 
idea that the implied policies slow down environmental problems. What equation 7 does is at each 
time weighting the associated values on the three curves with the shares of the associated opinions to 
derive the environmental change. This can be seen as representing an underlying democratic process, 
such as a governing coalition government with participating parties finding a middle ground between 





Figure 6. Degree of environmental problems depending on the dominant opinion 
 
Including this additional feedback, we run the extended model and report the results in Figure B4a 
(in Appendix B). They are close to the ones obtained with the basic model (Figure 4), demonstrating 
robustness of our previous findings. We also considered an alternative political-democratic case 
where policy is determined by the opinion with the highest share rather than by an average of opinions 
as in equation 7. This does not produce significantly different results (Figure B4b in Appendix B). 
Our analysis here merely illustrates that our model is capable of addressing this issue, and that its 
inclusion does not much affect the outcomes. This line of research could be further developed by 
incorporating knowledge from political sciences about how the distribution of political opinions 
precisely affects environmental policy stringency. But since this distribution will take some form in 
between the extremes examined here, it is not to be expected to alter our findings. 
 
6. Interpretations and conclusion 
The results of the simulations are summarized in Table 3. Three main insights can be derived from it. 
First, adjacent social interactions among groups – arguably the more realistic assumption for the 
current opinion dynamics on growth-versus-environment – generate distinct results from global 
interactions in terms of long term survival of growth-at-all-cost and green growth opinions (green 
coloured text in Table 3) but not of agrowth and degrowth opinions. Second, equal impacts of 
environmental change on opinions as shown in Table 2 (e.g., for green growth and agrowth in case 
A) do not always translate in joint survival of associated opinions. Third, the three cases address 
uncertainty about how environmental change affects opinion fitnesses, suggesting overall that 
growth-at-all-cost has the highest likelihood of disappearing, followed by green growth and agrowth, 
while degrowth always survives. Moreover, these qualitative outcomes are robust for adjacent versus 
global interactions, except with respect to green growth under case A and growth-at-all-cost under 
case B. Clearly, under local or adjacent interactions more diversity of opinions survives due to the 
extinction of certain opinions creating a barrier which prevents communication between individuals 
holding very distinct opinions. 
The results also provide information about the final distribution of opinion shares, which has 
relevance as we set the initial distribution in accordance with recent public opinion research. Under 
adjacent interactions, the share of green growth is highest in cases A and C, while in case B agrowth 
dominates. If social interactions are global, degrowth dominates in case A, agrowth in case B and 
green growth in case C. Table 3 reports the ultimate shares as well as their averages for all three cases. 
Under the more realistic case of adjacent interactions, the three opinions green growth, agrowth and 
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degrowth perform rather similar in terms of survival, though they have distinct average opinion 
shares. Under global interactions, green growth performs much worse, agrowth almost the same and 
degrowth better. 
 Generally, we find that under adjacent interactions among opinion groups, ultimate outcomes 
are characterized by diversity of opinions, i.e. a lack of consensus. These results suggest that the 
growth-vs-environment debate is likely to continue for a long time into the future. However, our 
findings also suggest that under worsening environmental conditions AG and DG become politically 
more feasible as people shift away from GG to these two opinion groups. If one were to implement 
policies that foster interactions beyond adjacent groups, i.e. global interactions, then an evolution 
towards consensus would be more likely. Such consensus might contribute to achieving critical 
support for sustainability policies. We extended the basic model with feedback from opinions to 
policy and to environmental change. It shows the robustness of our findings, as well as that our model 
is capable of addressing this issue.  
As this is the first study of its kind, there is ample room for further research. Next to the 
impact of environmental change on opinions, one could account for the effect of low growth or a 
recession on opinions. We have not considered this case as this particular causality has not been 
observed in reality, which also means that there is no relevant empirical data to undertake model 
calibration for analysing such a case. Another, somewhat related case is an exogenous economic crisis 
that reduces concern about environmental problems (Scruggs and Benegal, 2012), which might be 
interpreted as potentially shifting opinions from AG and DG to GC and GG. Next, the assumptions 
of linearity in Figure 3 and equation 6 might be replaced by nonlinear relationships – whether concave 
or convex – based on empirical evidence about how quickly people have changed their opinions in 
response to concrete environmental changes. On the other hand, these assumptions, including the 
scaling of the parameters 𝑏𝑖, are not very restrictive as they do not affect the final stable distribution 
of opinions but only the speed of opinion dynamics and, thus, the time at which stability is achieved. 
Another line of research is to develop an agent-based model (ABM) of opinion dynamics to address 
diversity of individuals in a more sophisticated manner. In tandem, additional empirical or 
experimental research would be required to support the larger number of parameter values in such an 
ABM approach. Finally, feedback from opinion to policy to environmental-change could be 
elaborated by including relevant insights from political sciences about how exactly the distribution 
of political opinions affects environmental policy stringency. 
 
Table 3. Summary of opinion survival for adjacent/global interactions 
Case Growth-at-all-cost 
(GC) 
































(0.02/0.00) (0.40/0.20) (0.32/0.28) (0.26/0.51) 
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Note: Ultimate opinion shares for adjacent/global interactions are reported in parentheses. Green colour denotes 
combinations with distinct survival outcomes under adjacent and global interactions. 
 
Appendix A. The basic model 
We develop a multi-group replicator dynamics model. It extends the basic replicator dynamics 
(Taylor and Jonker, 1978) for n strategies (in our case opinions), which describes a single group of 
individuals, that is, global interactions among individuals: 
 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓̅), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.        (1) 
 
Here ?̇?𝑖 (≡ 𝑑𝑠𝑖/𝑑𝑡) represents the change in the share of opinion i in the population. For a detailed 
treatment and extensions of this model, see Nowak (2006). Average fitness is defined as the weighted 
sum of the fitnesses of each opinion 𝑓𝑖: 
 
 𝑓̅ = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 .          (2) 
 
The aggregate character of replicator dynamics allows multiple interpretations, notably learning, 
imitation and conformism. Either is relevant to our application as individuals may learn by studying 
information about the relationship between growth and the environment, or copy the opinions of 
others who they trust, or be conformist, i.e. follow the majority opinion. 
To more precisely address assortment and conformism, we are interested in extending the 
simple replicator model to a population with subgroups. This is not to be confused with multi-
population replicator dynamics, a special case of multi-population games, which describes 
interactions among groups of individuals with distinct roles, such as police and hooligans, each with 
specific strategy sets (Bennet, 1980; Kanazawa et al., 2003). Instead, our approach is closer to what 
is known as replicator dynamics with population structure or assortment (see e.g., Fatas-Villafranca 
et al., 2011 and Almudi et al., 2017), which leads to departures from random matching as in the 
homogenous population replicator case (van Veelen, 2011). To allow for describing particular 
interactions between groups in the population, each consisting of individuals with the same option, 
we rewrite equation 1 as: 
 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓?̅?) + 𝑠𝑖(𝑓?̅? − 𝑓̅), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.      (3) 
 
The first part reflects the influence of group-specific interactions and the second of global 
interactions. Here 𝑓?̅? denotes group-specific average fitness, which deviates from global average 















 denotes the networking intensity/psychological resistance of the contributing fitness of 
individuals in group 𝑗 to the effective average fitness (i.e. which influences change of opinions) of 
individuals in group 𝑖 (with 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
≤ 1). If 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 1 ∀ 𝑖 , 𝑗, then 𝑓?̅? = 𝑓𝑖 ∀ 𝑖 causing equation 3 to 
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simplify to 1. In other words, the 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 represent the network structure of interactions among 
individuals. The details of this were discussed in the main text. 
The expression in equation 4 demonstrate that the 𝑤𝑗
𝑖𝑠𝑖 effectively function as networking 
intensities/psychological resistance. But while 𝑠𝑖 are endogenous and reflect the variable number of 
individuals in adjacent groups that may influence each other, 𝑤𝑗
𝑖 are exogenous and capture more 
stable personality or behavioural factors, such as openness to other opinions, docility or conformity, 
and even curiosity. These fitness specifications may thus be seen to capture average susceptibility of 
individuals in a group to other opinions, even though in reality there may be diversity: for instance, 
some individuals are strongly convinced about their opinion or not influenced by individuals or 
opinions from other groups, while others may have doubts or be in contact with outgroup-individuals. 
The right hand side of equation 4 contains a denominator to assure that the fitness values are 







. Note that these 
weights add up to one if summed over i, (i.e. one does not need to impose the separate 
condition ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑗𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1) and are replaced by a zero value if 𝑤𝑖
𝑖𝑠𝑖 and the denominator are both zero 
(to avoid the problem of dividing by zero). 
Equation 4 reflects potential asymmetry of effects of adjacent groups. This can work three 
ways. First, the value of the fitness parameter 𝑓𝑖 matters, and it can differ between adjacent groups, 
so that one group has a stronger intrinsic influence on adjacent groups than another. Second, the size 
of the group matters, which captures the fact that a larger group of individuals with a certain opinion 
has, ceteris paribus, more potential to influence the opinions of individuals in an adjacent group than 
a smaller group. One might also use the networking intensities/psychological resistance (or the 
fitnesses) to capture individual differences in terms of commitment to their position (Xie et al., 2011).  
In equation 3 the first term 𝑠𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓?̅?) represents direct group interactions, but there still is a 
second term, namely 𝑠𝑖(𝑓?̅? − 𝑓̅). The latter can be interpreted as remaining global interactions. We 
would now like to cancel any effects of the latter, as we want to model a situation that allows for only 
local effects or interactions between adjacent groups. The way to accomplish this is revising equation 
3, under the constraint that the changes described in shares sum up to zero (i.e. the shares sum up to 
one). We do this by calculating the sum of all the second terms across the four groups, leading to 
what we might call the global effect 𝑔 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗(𝑓?̅? − 𝑓̅)
𝑛
𝑗=1 , and then replacing the second term in 
equation 3 by g/n. This will result in an equal (though not constant) global effect for each group, 
which summed is equal to 𝑛 · 𝑔/𝑛 = 𝑔. In other words, the sum of the shares does not alter, while 
the differences between the dynamics of the shares is determined now by the first term, that is, group-
internal and group-adjacent opinion influences. Equation 2 then is replaced by the following adapted 
replicator equation (generalized for n opinions): 
 
?̇?𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓?̅?) +
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑠𝑗(𝑓?̅? − 𝑓̅)
𝑛
𝑗=1 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛.     (5) 
 
People’s environmental concern increases through direct and indirect experiences of 
environmental problems. To capture this, we include an exogenous index E expressing the 
development of environmental pressure or problems over time, such as climate change or biodiversity 
loss, under an assumed pattern of continued economic growth. A rise in this index denotes a 
deterioration of the environment, which will have heterogeneous effects on fitnesses of distinct 
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opinions 𝑓𝑖. In particular, the opinion fitnesses are defined by an exogenous, constant part 𝑐 and a 
variable, endogenous part, as follows (assuming that the initial value of index E is zero): 
 
𝑓𝑖 = 𝑐+𝑏𝑖𝐸.          (6) 
 
With respect to sensitivities to real-world changes, we make the following assumptions. GC ignores 
the environment. Although one might think this view is extreme, Drews and van den Bergh (2016) 
find that a small proportion of individuals falls into this category. This study further suggests that on 
the other end of the spectrum, DG shows the highest sensitivity to environmental change, indicating 
that support of degrowth is significantly associated with environmental values. The two remaining 
groups GG and AG fall in-between. Formally, these assumptions mean that 0 = 𝑏1 ≤ 𝑏2 ≤ 𝑏3 ≤ 𝑏4 
to reflect that worsening of environmental quality under growth will generally more positively affect 
the fitnesses of opinions more to the right in Figure 1. This might be seen as a special case of a more 
general phenomenon that people pay more attention to those issues that correspond to their 
worldview. Note that since only relative values of fitnesses matter, we can set 𝑏1 = 0. As for the 
environmental quality component 𝐸, starting at a value zero (no impact on fitnesses), we will consider 
the case that over time it deteriorates, captured by a linear increase over the entire period (permanent 
environmental change, such as global warming), or only for a short time interval (temporary 
environmental change, such as ozone depletion), as illustrated in Figure 3. This allows us to assess 
the differential effects of permanent and temporary environmental changes on opinions. Note that a 
constant 𝐸 over the entire period considered would translate into an exogenous and constant fitness, 
while a decreasing 𝐸 (improving environmental quality) would have the opposite effect of an 





Appendix B. Results from sensitivity analyses and policy feedback 
 
   






Figure B2. Dynamics of opinion fitnesses and shares over time under permanent environmental 


















Figure B3. Dynamics of opinion fitnesses and shares over time under permanent environmental 
change and higher psychological resistance (𝑤𝑖
𝑖 = 0.8 and 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
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